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Financial Advisers - new remuneration constraints and competency 




The provision of financial advice within the Australian financial services market has been, and 
remains, an area of very considerable regulatory scrutiny and legislative activity. The Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)2 has identified a high level of non-compliance in the 
quality of advice given and misaligned incentives in remuneration arrangements that exacerbates 
conflict of interest problems. In particular, ASIC found a strong connection between high upfront 
commissions, policy lapse rates and poor consumer outcomes. 
Similarly, the Trowbridge Final Report3 , Murray Inquiry4 and a Parliamentary Joint Committee5 
recommended several reforms, including modified remuneration arrangements for advisers and 
licensees to minimise conflicts inherent in existing arrangements and the need to improve advice 
standards through the upgrading of education, training and professional requirements and through 
enhanced client engagement. 
These reports and inquiries have collectively informed and generated a package of life insurance 
remuneration and, more generally, financial adviser competency reforms. These are contained in 
two pieces of legislation titled the Corporations Amendment (Life Insurance Remuneration 
Arrangements) Act 2017, and the Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial 
Advisers) Act 2017. These Acts were passed by both Houses on 9 February 2017 and assented to on 
22 February 2017. 
This article considers these new Acts in some detail as well as the market context and the rationale 
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Financial Advice (‘FOFA’) reforms7 ushered in by the Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial 
Advice Act 2012 enhanced the requirement for disclosure of fees and services to clients and gave the 
Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) greater ability to supervise the financial 
services industry, through changes to its licensing and banning powers for financial advisers8.  The 
Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) Act 2012 added to the FOA 
agenda by requiring persons who are providing personal financial advice to retail clients to act in the 
best interests of their clients, and to give priority to their clients’ interests.9 Further incursions into 
the financial advice marketplace were implemented by the Corporations Amendment (Financial 
Advice) Regulation 201510 and the Corporations Amendment ( Financial Advice Measures) Act 2016, 
after nearly two years on the Parliamentary agenda11. The net effect of the Act and Regulations is to 
ameliorate some of the obligations upon financial advisers whereby they are able to satisfy their 
best interests obligations. For instance, the FOFA changes enable clients and providers to agree upon 
the scope of advice to be provided, deals with the removal of renewal notice obligations upon fee 
recipients and the requirement to provide yearly fee disclosure statements to certain clients, and 
exempts benefits that relate to general advice from the ban on conflicted remuneration in certain 
circumstances.12 
Against this rather intense backdrop of legislative activity, a casual observer, as opposed to an 
industry insider or regulator, might be forgiven for having reached the mistaken conclusion that 
there could not be more concurrent activity dealing with financial advice. The reality is different with 
very significant legislative change effected in February 2017 to permissible remuneration 
arrangements within the life insurance advisory context and through new mandated professional 
standards for financial planners and advisers. 
A major, if not exclusive, catalyst for these changes is Report 413 produced by ASIC, published in 
October 2014, entitled “Review of retail life insurance advice”13. This Report presents the findings of 
ASIC’s research into, and surveillance of, personal advice given to consumers about life insurance. In 
explaining the purpose of this project ASIC stated as follows: 
“ASIC has a focus on life insurance advice because of its critical importance to the long-term 
financial wellbeing of Australian consumers. Life insurance is a key product through which 
consumers manage risk for themselves and their families. Quality financial advice helps 
consumers identify their life insurance needs and find appropriate and affordable products 
that meet those needs”.14 
The Life Insurance Advice Report identified a high level of non-compliance in the quality of advice 
given and misaligned incentives in remuneration arrangements that exacerbated conflict of interest 
problems. In particular, ASIC found a strong connection between high upfront commissions, policy 
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lapse rates and poor consumer outcomes15. In response to this Report, the Federal government 
called upon industry to review remuneration practices within the life insurance industry and Mr John 
Trowbridge was appointed as an independent chair of the Review of Retail Life Insurance Advice16. 
This review recommended several reforms, including modified remuneration arrangements for 
advisers and licensees to minimise conflicts inherent in existing arrangements, especially the 
perverse incentives or temptations associated with high initial commissions and the replacement 
policy or ‘churn’ problem. 17 The Trowbridge Final Report also emphasised the need to improve 
advice standards through the upgrading of education, training and professional requirements and 
through enhanced client engagement18. 
The government also commissioned a review of Australia’s financial system, the Financial System 
Inquiry19, led by Mr David Murray AO. This review recommended a complete abolition of the current 
upfront commission model, and a move to level commissions, where any upfront commission does 
not exceed ongoing commissions. This review also recommended lifting the competency of financial 
advisers to improve the quality of financial advice and to ensure high quality consumer outcomes 
and to maintain confidence in the industry. Concurrently, a Parliamentary Joint Committee (PJC) on 
Corporations and Financial Services20 reported on ways to lift the professional, ethical and 
educational standards in the financial services industry. 
The ASIC Life Insurance Advice Report, the Trowbridge Final Report, the Financial System Inquiry and 
the PJC collectively informed and generated a package of life insurance remuneration reforms and, 
more generally, financial adviser competency reforms. These are contained in two pieces of 
legislation titled the Corporations Amendment (Life Insurance Remuneration Arrangements) Act 
2017, and the Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017. 
These Acts were passed by both Houses on 9 February 2017 and assented to on 22 February 2017. 
This article considers these new Acts in some detail as well as the market context and the rationale 
underpinning these reform measures. The article foreshadows also additional reform measures on 
the horizon. 
2. The market context 
For life insurance distributed under personal advice models, advisers are typically paid under 
commission arrangements. These commission arrangements vary across the industry but typically 
the categories are upfront commission, being 100% to 130% of the new business premium and an 
ongoing commission, or trail,  of around 10% of renewal premiums; hybrid commission, being a 
upfront commission of around 70% of the new business premium and an ongoing commission of 
around 20% of renewal premiums; level commission, usually a flat rate upfront commission of 
around 30% of the new business premium and an ongoing commission of around 30% of renewal 
premiums; no commission, which will include fee for service remuneration arrangements where 
typically the adviser will rebate any commission payable by the insurer to the client who pays the 
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adviser a negotiate fee for the service contingent upon the nature, scope and complexity of advice 
sought; and, finally; salaried employee situations where remuneration is not by commission21. 
The high upfront commission model is heavily criticised in the ASIC Life Insurance Advice Report, the 
Trowbridge Review, the Financial System Inquiry and by the PJC. The principal reasons for the 
criticism are twofold.  
First, upfront commissions affect the quality of the advice ASIC found that 96 per cent of advice 
rated as a ‘fail’ was given by advisers paid under an upfront commission model. ASIC also found that 
more than a third of personal advice reviewed failed to comply with the laws relating to appropriate 
advice and did not prioritise the needs of the consumer; rather high commissions encouraged 
advisers to replace a consumer’s policy, rather than retain it, even where the replacement policy had 
inferior terms22. The Trowbridge Final Report23 categorises high upfront commission remuneration 
arrangements as the major problem to be addressed in dealing with conflicts of interest. The Report 
points to the perverse incentives or temptations associated with high initial commissions and the 
replacement policy or “churn” problem, whereby under existing commission arrangements there 
can be a large financial reward to the adviser for replacing an existing policy with a new one.24 The 
strong financial incentive to change or churn life insurance can be particularly problematic where 
inadequate replacement advice is given and there is a failure to address adequately the disclosure 
requirements under the provisions of the Insurance Contracts Act 198425. Recent case law26 and 
determinations by the Financial Ombudsman Service27 highlight the importance of ensuring that 
there is compliance with disclosure requirements when switching or replacing existing insurance 
products. While an existing cover may not be subject to avoidance by the insurer, the non-disclosure 
in question being more than 3 years after the contract was entered into, the replacement policy 
itself may be avoided by the insurer for non-disclosure during the new three-year window that arises 
with the new cover.28 
Second, while remuneration arrangements that pay high commissions to advisers may be important 
to insurers to win new business these high upfront commission arrangements contribute to high 
lapse rates and poor commercial outcomes for insurers. As ASIC observes: 
“High upfront commissions give advisers an incentive to write new business. The more 
premiums they write, the more they earn. There is no incentive to provide advice that does 
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28 For example, in Commonwealth Financial Planning Ltd v Couper [2013] NSWCA 444, the life insured had a 
life policy with Westpac Life. He was persuaded by an authorized representative of CFP to take out life cover 
with another insurer, CommInsure, and to cancel his existing policy. The life insured’s true medical history was 
not disclosed to CommInsure. When the life insured was diagnosed with terminal pancreatic cancer, 
CommInsure avoided the policy for non-disclosure pursuant to s.29(3) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984, 
which entitled the insurer to avoid the life insurance policy for non-fraudulent non-disclosure within three 
years from entry into the contract. That three year period had long since expired in relation to the life 
insured’s prior Westpac policy. 
not result in a product sale or to provide advice that they retain an existing policy unless the 
advice is to purchase additional covers or increase the sum insured.”29 
Insurers attempt to manage or limit this loss of business at a point in the policy life cycle where they 
have no prospect of recovering high upfront costs through clawback provisions, whereby they seek 
to recover or ‘claw back’ commissions or benefits paid to advisers. This clawback is designed to 
provide a disincentive to advisers to rewrite insurance cover for existing clients within a certain 
period, usually within the first 12 months the policy is on foot.30  
 The Trowbridge Final Report also highlights the need to improve advice standards through the 
upgrading of education, training and professional requirements, better client engagement and a 
more streamlined process through the three stages of the advice and sales process, which are 
strategic advice, product advice and product placement.31 Similarly, ASIC, in assessing the current 
state of the market, has urged AFS licensees to review the training and competency of advisers 
giving life insurance advice.32 
Against this brief background of key market dynamics, the article now turns to a consideration of the 
recent legislative enactments.  
 
3. Corporations Amendment (Life Insurance Remuneration Arrangements) Act 201733 
This Act amends the Corporations Act 2001 to remove the broad exemption from the conflicted 
remuneration ban on benefits paid in relation to certain life risk products34 and enables ASIC to 
make a legislative instrument to permit benefits in relation to life risk products to be paid, provided 
certain requirements are met.35 The reforms introduced that cover personal and general advice, 
including direct sales channels where there is a general advice element, will commence on 1 January 
2018. 
Conflicted remuneration is defined in the Corporations Act36 as any benefit, whether monetary or 
non-monetary, given to a financial services licensee, who provides product advice to persons as 
retail clients that, because of the nature of the benefit or the circumstances in which it is given, 
could reasonably be expected to influence the choice of financial product recommended or the 
financial product advice given to retail clients. 
A major effect of the Life Insurance Remuneration Act is that all benefits paid in relation to life risk 
insurance products, whether offered inside or outside superannuation, will be considered conflicted 
remuneration. The prior exemption for life insurance outside of superannuation from the conflicted 
remuneration arrangements under FOFA was largely based on concerns about affordability and the 
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potential for under-insurance.37 For example, the Murray Inquiry did not recommend removing all 
commissions, as it concluded that some consumers may not purchase life insurance if the advice 
involved an upfront fee38. Further, there is economic analysis that supports a commission-based 
model  as being superior to an alternative upfront fee-for-service approach, dependent upon the 
extent to which consumers are willing to directly pay for advice they receive and the value they 
place upon that advice.39 However, in removing this exemption from the conflicted remuneration 
provisions in the Corporations Act, the legislature has recognised  that commission-based 
arrangements for the sale of life insurance, “where products can be complex and there exists 
asymmetric information between buyer and seller about remuneration arrangements, can lead to 
greater incentives to provide biased advice to unsophisticated potential consumers”. As ASIC noted 
upfront commissions can significantly impact the quality of advice. ASIC found that the way an 
adviser was paid (for example under an upfront commission model compared to a hybrid, level or no 
commission model) had a statistically significant bearing on the likelihood of their client receiving 
advice that did not comply with the law. ASIC reported as follows: 
“… we found that where the adviser was paid under an upfront commission model, the pass 
rate was 55% with a 45% fail rate. Where the adviser was paid under another commission 
structure, the pass rate was 93% with a 7% fail rate. Our findings in his review indicate that 
the impact of adviser conflicts of interest on the quality of life insurance advice is an 
industry-wide problem.”40 
The approach taken by the legislation does not extinguish the influence of commission-based 
remuneration arrangements within the life insurance industry, but rather controls the way and 
extent commissions may be deployed. From 1 January 2018, the exemption on the ban on conflicted 
remuneration will only apply to life insurance products if the benefit ratio for the benefit is the same 
for each year in which the product is continued; or the benefit satisfies the benefit ratio 
requirements and claw back requirements under the Act. These pivotal terms are defined in the 
legislation as follows: 
The benefit ratio for a benefit given to a financial services licensee, or a representative of a financial 
services licensee, in relation to a life risk insurance product, or life risk insurance products, for a year 
is the ratio between: 
                     (a)  the benefit; and 
                     (b)  the policy cost payable for the product or products, or that part of the policy cost 
payable for the product or products to which the benefit relates, for the year.41 
The policy cost for a life risk insurance product, or products, for a year is the sum of: 
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                     (a)  the premiums payable for the product, or products, for that year; and 
                     (b)  any fees payable for that year to the issuer of the product or products for that issue; 
and 
                     (c)  any additional fees payable because the premium for the product, or products, is 
paid periodically rather than in a lump sum; and 
                     (d)  any other amount prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this paragraph42. 
The benefit ratio requirements are satisfied in relation to a benefit given to a financial services 
licensee, or a representative of a financial services licensee, in relation to a life risk insurance 
product, or life risk insurance products, if the benefit ratio for the benefit for: 
                     (a)  the year in which the product or products are issued; and 
                     (b)  each year during which the product or products are continued; 
is equal to or less than that determined by ASIC…as an acceptable benefit ratio for that year.43 
The clawback requirements are satisfied in relation to a benefit given to a financial services licensee, 
or a representative of a financial services licensee, in relation to a life risk insurance product, or life 
risk insurance products, if: 
                     (a)  the arrangement under which the benefit is payable includes an obligation to repay 
all or part of the benefit if: 
                              (i)  the product, or one of the products, is cancelled or is not continued, other than 
because a claim is made under the insurance policy or because other 
prescribed circumstances exist; or 
                             (ii)  the policy cost for the product, or one of the products, during a year or across 2 
years is reduced, other than in prescribed circumstances; 
                            within 2 years after the product is first issued to a retail client; and 
                     (b)  the amount to be repaid under the obligation is equal to or greater than the amount 
determined by ASIC under subsection (4) as an acceptable repayment. 
             (4)  ASIC may, by legislative instrument, determine the amount, or a way of working out the 
amount, that is an acceptable repayment for the purposes of paragraph (3)(b)44. 
 
The legislative amendments make life risk policies subject to the conflicted remuneration regime 
with an exception from the ban for policies that have a flat commission structure, and for policies 
with upfront and ongoing commissions which are within specified caps and which are subject to a 
clawback requirement.45  
This steers a middle course through the proposals of the Trowbridge Final Report46 advocating a 
fixed level of commission (maximum 20% of premiums) supplemented by an ‘initial advice payment’ 
and the recommendations of the Murray Inquiry47 which were for a level commission structure 
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requiring that an upfront commission is not greater than the ongoing commission48.The level 
commission structure provides, as the Murray Inquiry advocated,49 a balanced and cost effective 
approach to better align the interests of advisers and consumers.  
In allowing a further exemption from the conflicted remuneration ban where ASIC has set the 
maximum commission amount for both the first year of the premium (upfront commission) and for 
subsequent years (ongoing commissions) for certain life insurance products, the ‘benefit ratio’, a 
sensible flexibility to accommodate market conditions has been catered for in the legislation. The 
second requirement to obtain the benefit of an exemption from the conflicted remuneration ban 
under this exception, is adherence to the clawback requirements. Clawback is where a certain 
portion of upfront commission is paid back to the life risk insurer from the financial adviser, under 
certain circumstances. The legislation specifies that when clawback occurs within the first two years 
of a policy where the product is cancelled or is not continued, other than because a claim is made 
under the policy of because other prescribed circumstances exist,50ASIC has the power to determine 
how much is clawed back51. The introduction of mandatory clawback arrangements is intended to 
limit advisers’ incentive to ‘churn’ clients through to a new product in order to receive a new upfront 
commission”.52  
The new legislation addresses also non-commission remuneration and other benefits granted by 
insurers to licensees that contain any incentives that might compromise the effectiveness of the 
adviser remuneration reforms or otherwise compromise the ability of advisers to choose freely, in 
their clients’ interests, the most suitable providers of insurance protection for their clients. Examples 
given in the Trowbridge Final Report of non-commission benefits commonly available to licensees 
“are volume-based payments, free or subsidised business equipment and services, hospitality-
related benefits, shares or other interests in a product issuer or dealer group, marketing assistance 
and some ‘buyer of last resort’ arrangements”.53 As the Trowbridge Final Report notes these 
practices can create conflicts of interest for licensees that affect advised clients because in effect the 
conflicts are transmitted to their advisers. These practices were already prohibited under the FoFA 
legislation in respect of investment products and the new Act removes the exemption life insurance 
products had enjoyed from this prohibition54.  
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53 At p.8 
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4. Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017 
This Act, which introduces wide ranging reforms and increased compliance obligations in the 
financial advisory industry from 1 January 2019. It introduces compulsory education requirements 
for both new and existing financial advisers, supervision requirements for new advisers, a code of 
ethics for the industry to apply from 1 January 2020 and ongoing professional development 
obligations. 
In providing the critical backgrounding to the Bill, the Explanatory Memorandum55 states that: 
“In recent years, numerous cases of inappropriate financial advice have had a negative 
impact on consumers’ confidence in the financial services industry. This lack of trust has 
become a barrier to consumers seeking financial advice. 
The financial services industry, consumer groups, the Government, and the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) have raised concerns with the existing 
education and training requirements for financial advisers.”56 
In lifting the bar for individuals who may use the titles ‘financial adviser’ and ‘financial planner’ and 
provide personal advice to retail clients on relevant financial products57, the Act requires the 
satisfaction of three conditions. The conditions are: (a) complete a bachelor or higher degree or 
equivalent qualification; (b) pass an examination that will be a common benchmark across the 
industry and (c) undertake at least one year of relevant work and training (the professional year)58. 
Furthermore, providers have an obligation to complete continuous professional development (CPD) 
and Licensees have an ongoing obligation to ensure that their relevant providers comply with the 
CPD requirement. 
The requirements for the degree, professional year, examination and CPD requirements are to be 
determined by a new Standards body59 that will be established, and funded by industry, to 
administer the new regime. 
Transitional arrangements give the financial advisory industry a fairly generous timeframe to satisfy 
the new educational requirements. The new educational requirements do not start until 1 January 
2019, with existing advisers given until 1 January 2021 to pass the examination. 
The new Act also amends the Corporations Act 2001 setting out ethical standards for relevant 
providers. Relevant providers are required to comply with a Code to be made by the Standards Body, 
and compliance with the Code is to monitored and enforced under schemes approved by ASIC.  The 
Code will set out ethical obligations that apply to relevant providers and these ethical obligations are 
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58 Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017, Schedule 1, Part 1, Item 
12; Corporations Act 2001, s. 921B. 
 
59 Standards body to be declared under the Corporations Act 2001, s.921X. 
intended to “go above the legal requirements in the law and are designed to encourage higher 
standards of behaviour and professionalism in the financial services industry.”60 
While the Code is to be developed by the new Standards body61, compliance with the Code is to be 
monitored and enforced by monitoring bodies in accordance with schemes that are approved by 
ASIC62. A Scheme63 has a named monitoring body, a name and includes information about the 
process for resolving disputes between the monitoring body and the relevant provider, and the 
process for customers to make complaints.64 A monitoring body may be any entity, such as a 
professional association, but may not be a licensee who already has an obligation to ensure that 
their financial advisers act honestly and fairly under general licensing conditions.65 
 
5. Additional Reforms on the horizon 
The legislative agenda and changes within the financial services market outlined above is not the 
end – more reform is on the horizon. ASIC, in their Report 498, published in October 2016, entitled 
“Life insurance claims: An industry review”66, outline their findings of an industry-wide review of 
claims handling in the life insurance industry. The purpose of this review was to determine if there 
were any systemic concerns that apply either to the industry as a whole or to particular insurers. 
This review examined four main types of life insurance products being life (for example, cover for 
death), total and permanent disability (TPD), trauma, and income protection. Investment -linked life 
insurance and other products issued by life insurers such as funeral insurance and consumer credit 
insurance were not examined, having previously been the subject of separate examination.67  
This review was commenced in April 2016 in response to media reports on a number of concerns 
about life insurance claims handling practices of CommInsure.68 The review did not find evidence of 
systemic misconduct across the life insurance industry in relation to claims payment and procedures, 
with 90% of claims paid in the first instance69. However, ASIC did identify issues of concern in 
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67 See ASIC, Report 454, “Funeral Insurance: A snapshot”, October 2015; ASIC, Report 256, “Consumer credit 
Insurance: A review of sales practices by authorized deposit-taking institutions”, October 2011. 
68 In March 2016, the ABC Four Corners program and Fairfax Media publications jointly reported on a number 
of concerns about the life insurance claims handling practices of The Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society 
Limited (trading as CommInsure and following the publication of these concerns ASIC began a formal 
investigation into CommInsure and also initiated their overarching review of claims handling in the life 
insurance industry. See Life Insurance Claims Report, para. 83 -86. 
69 Life Insurance Claims Report, para.18. 
relation to declined claim rates and claims handling procedures associated with particular types of 
policies, notably TPD70, particular insurers71 and particular causes of consumer disputes.72 
As a consequence of this Review, ASIC have foreshadowed several key areas of action for ASIC and 
insurers, with a view towards improving claims handling outcomes for consumers. These actions are 
as follows: 
(a) Public reporting of life insurance claims73 
ASIC and APRA will work with insurers and other stakeholders in 2017 to establish a better quality, 
consistent public reporting regime for claims data and claims outcomes, including claims handling 
timeframes and dispute levels across all policy types. This data is to be made available on an industry 
and individual insurer basis. 
(b) Strengthening the regulatory framework for claims handling74 
ASIC has recommended75 that the current exemption accorded to ‘handling insurance claims’ 
contained in the conduct provisions of the Corporations Act 2001, be removed76. Further ASIC 
recommends that more significant penalties for misconduct in relation to insurance claims handling 
are also included in a review of ASIC’s penalty powers. 
 
(c) Strengthening the dispute resolution framework for claims handling77 
ASIC highlights the need to ensure better and more effective consideration of issues of fairness to 
supplement the existing jurisdiction and to give better access to consumers with complaints about 
delays in claims handling and ensure better remedies when these complaints are found in favour of 
the consumer. 
ASIC has also stated that it will increase surveillance of areas of concern identified in the review 
(including those insurers with the highest decline rates and highest proportional dispute numbers), 
and will conduct a major review of distribution of direct life policies. 
Furthermore, ASIC recommends78 that the insurance sector undertake the following: 
• Review the currency and appropriateness of policy definitions; 
• Examine and ensure advertising and representations about coverage align with definitions 
and the policy, and report discrepancies to ASIC; 
                                                             
70 Life Insurance Claims Report, para.26, TPD denial rates were found to be as high as 37% and trauma, up to 
25%. 
71 Life Insurance Claims Report, para.29, notes that as a proportion of their share of claims, some insurers 
declined more claims than others, and for certain types of distribution channels, particularly non-advised, the 
decline rate was higher than the industry generally. 
72 Life Insurance Claims Report, para.34-42, states that 72% of life insurance disputes are claims related, with 
most of those disputes being in relation to evidence the policyholder is required to provide to the insurer to 
assess their claim, timeframes to assess a claim and the declined claim itself. 
73 Life Insurance Claims Report, para.46-47. 
74 Life Insurance Claims Report, para.48. 
75 Life Insurance Claims Report, para.48. 
 
76 See Corporations Act 2001, s766A (2) and Corporations Regulations 2001, regulation 7.1.33 (10, (2). 
77 Life Insurance Claims Report, para.49. 
78 Life Insurance Claims Report, para.52-54. 
• Ensure that timeframes are consistent with industry standards and expected timeframes 
effectively communicated to policyholders; and; 
• Ensure that incentives and performance measures for claims handling staff and 
management do not conflict with the obligation to assess each claim on its merits. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Advice consumers receive relative to life insurance and their claims experience are obviously both of 
critical importance. In targeting these areas ASIC builds upon other work that it has undertaken 
looking at the quality of retirement advice and advice about self-managed superannuation funds 
(SMSFs).79 
The exceptions to conflicted remuneration that are allowed to continue in the aftermath of the 
Corporations Amendment (Life Insurance Remuneration Arrangements) Act are reasonable and well 
grounded. The modified remuneration arrangements strike a good balance by minimising the 
conflicts and perverse incentives80 associated with high initial commissions and the replacement or 
“churn” problem, whilst preserving a sustainable remuneration model. There was a clear need to 
address market problems but at the same time to side-step the risk that providers would exit the 
market, making it more difficult for consumers to obtain life insurance advice.81 
Similarly, the intent behind the professional standards legislation is totally supportable as the 
reforms are designed to increase the education, training and ethical standards of financial advisers. 
However, due to the fairly lengthy transitional process that has been adopted, Belinda Randall’s 
observations are pertinent: 
“Time will tell whether the reforms will be effective in improving standards (and reducing 
claims) in an industry which has been best with problems in recent times, including litigation 
often funded by PI insurers. It will be interesting to see if these changes will ultimately lead 
to a changed risk profile for insuring Australia’s 20,000 plus financial advisers (and AFSL 
holders). This may not be known for several years yet.”82 
The life insurance industry has been acutely aware of the widespread concerns and criticisms of the 
industry and in endeavour to ensure that insurer practices and obligations are lifted substantially to 
better meet consumer needs and expectations the Financial Services Council (FSC) released a Life 
Insurance Code of Practice on 11 October 2016. In launching this Code the FSC states that this “first-
ever industry-led consumer code of practice”83 is first and foremost for consumers. The Code 
endeavours to respond to some of the issues raised by ASIC84 and the FSC describes the Code as 
requiring insurers ’to improve disclosure to customers, provide greater transparency in 
                                                             
79 See ASIC, Report 279, “Shadow shopping study of retirement advice”, March 2012; ASIC, Report 337, 
“SMSFs: Improving the quality of advice given to investors”, April 2013. 
80 Trowbridge Final Report, p.5. 
81 Murray Inquiry, p. 220. 
82 Belinda Randall, DLA Piper LP, “Senate Signs off on Financial Adviser Reforms – Changes to Claim 
Volume/Risk Profile Ahead?” http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a34de307-1d7b-4c6f-a5c5-
1130f3a9dd54 Accessed 28 February 2017. 
83 Financial Services Council (FSC), Media Release: Life Insurance Code of Practice 11 October 2016; 
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84 ASIC Report 498 refers to various parts of the Code which address some of the concerns raised by ASIC. 
communications, decide claims within set timeframes, limit the use of surveillance, and provide 
additional support for vulnerable members’85.  
The Code will be monitored by a Life Code Compliance Committee which will be able to receive 
complaints about non-compliance and ultimately sanction life insurers if they do not correct 
breaches of the Code. However, the Code is only mandatory for life insurers who are FSC members 
and it will not apply to superannuation trustees or to financial advisers. APRA has commented that 
these exemptions undermine the credibility of the Code86 and the Association of Financial Advisers 
(AFA) comments that: 
“The Code should include commitments to consumers and to the financial advice profession, 
as approximately 50 percent of Australia’s life insurance is arranged through the expert 
advice and support of financial advisers. The commitments to consumers contained in the 
Code are insufficient to drive cultural change, while the role of the life insurance financial 
advice profession has been ignored. 
Restricting the Code to setting out best practice standards for insurers in relation to 
underwriting and claims management does not go far enough in addressing the cultural 
issues and sales practices that work against consumer interests. The Code needs to also 
impact the organisational behaviours that unreasonably conflict an adviser in their Best 
Interests Duty and induce inappropriate replacement behaviours. This means the Code must 
contain commitments to advice professionals as well as to consumers”.87 
Nevertheless, the Code represents a significant step in the right direction and the amendments to 
the Corporations Act introduced by Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial 
Advisers) Act will enable the Standards body, once established, and ASIC to better monitor content 
of, and compliance with, Codes. 
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86 APRA puts super funds on notice over sale of life insurance http://theaustralian.com.au/business/financial-
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